A Long and Hungry Winter
From the editor: Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston have been unspoken rivals ever since they were classmates at West Point. For most of the time, since their graduation in 1829, Lee has held the edge. But now both men find themselves commanders of the two most important armies in the Confederacy. They both also find themselves facing the increasingly difficult problem of feeding and properly equipping their armies in the face of a strong enemy. The primary cause of this dilemma, and an underlying theme of the war to date, is the steady deterioration of the railroads of the Confederacy. Unlike the industrial North which embraced railroads, Southern states had constructed only 9,000 miles of track by 1861; divided between one-hundred and thirteen separate short-line railroads. The efficiency of the rail system has been further hampered by multiple gauges, weak wrought iron rails, poorly constructed roadbeds, flimsy trestles, and deficient maintenance. In May 1863, the Confederate Congress gave Quartermaster-General Alexander R. Lawton supervisory authority over the railroads, but President Davis has been unwilling to exercise this much needed control. As a result, both Lee and Johnston find themselves pleading with Richmond to increase the productivity of their vital railroad supply lines. In a letter to Davis, Lee advises: "If the railroad agents will take no care of the safety of the Government freight, Government agents had better be sent with each train of provisions." The situation is even more convoluted for Johnston because the state of Georgia owns the Western & Atlantic Railroad, which runs from Atlanta to Dalton. Governor Joe Brown claims the problems are caused by Confederate officers who “had lost or destroyed over 200 cars and eight engines" belonging to the railroad, and he has demanded "two good engines and fifty cars" for the railroad before Johnston’s supply problems can be addressed He has also issues a warning: "If this is done properly, General Johnston’s freight can be carried. If it is refused, the responsibility must rest where it belongs." Without adequate provisions, it will be a long and hungry winter for the soldiers of the Confederacy and there will be little either Lee or Johnston can do about it.
January 10 1864 (Sunday)
After receiving information from Frank Stringfellow, a scout for cavalry commander J.E.B. Stuart, Major John S. Mosby leads one hundred of his men to Loudoun Heights in an attempt to rout the unprotected camp of Henry A. Cole’s Potomac Home Brigade. He reports: "By marching my command by file along a narrow path I succeeded in gaining, a position in rear of the enemy between their camp and the ferry…. I had exact information up to dark of that evening of the number of the, enemy, the position of their headquarters, &c. When within 200 yards of the camp I sent Stringfellow on ahead with about 10 men to capture Major Cole and staff…. The camp was buried in profound sleep; there was not a sentinel awake. All my plans were on the eve of consummation when suddenly the party sent with Stringfellow came dashing over the hill toward the camp yelling and shooting…. Mistaking them for the enemy, I ordered my men to charge…. A severe fight ensued, in which they were driven from their camp, but taking refuge in the surrounding houses kept up a desultory firing." When Major Cole is able to rally his men and call for reinforcements, Mosby withdraws.
HDQRS. BATT. P.H.B. CAVALRY, MARYLAND VOLS., Loudoun Heights, Va., January 10, 1864.
Capt. WILLIAM M. BOONE, Assistant Adjutant-General: I have the honor of addressing you for the purpose of reporting the facts of an attempt by Major Mosby's battalion of guerrilla cavalry to surprise and capture my camp, between the hours of 3 and 4 a.m. of this day. They studiously avoided my pickets; divided themselves into small bodies, which were speedily-consolidated in sight of my camp. They then made an impetuous charge with a yell on the right of the same…. Company A, the second in the line, was speedily rallied by its commanding officer...who contested their farther advance in such a sanguinary manner that [they] formed a rallying point for the balance of the command, who were now thoroughly aroused of the danger that threatened them, and one and all, from the officer to the private, entered into the contest with such a determined zest as led to the utter rout and discomfiture of the enemy, and the signal failure of their base attempt.... I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY A. COLE, Major, Commanding.
Department of East Tennessee commander James Longstreet reaches out to Robert E. Lee with ideas about reuniting his command with the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet writes: "I have been trying to work out some plan by which we may begin operations before the enemy, and at least disconcert his plans. I do not think we can do anything here or at Chattanooga. I have concluded there is no other opportunity but in Virginia." Lee responds: "I am glad that you are casting about for some way to reach the enemy. If he could be defeated at some point before he is prepared to open the campaign it would be attended with the greatest advantages.... I believe, however, that if [Ulysses S. Grant] could be driven back and Mississippi and Tennessee recovered, it would do more to relieve the country and inspirate our people than the mere capture of Washington.... Not knowing what they (the enemy) intended to do, and what... [Johnston’s Army of Tennessee] can do, has prevented my recommending your return to this army. After hearing that you were in comfortable quarters and had plenty of provisions and forage, I thought it was best you should remain where you are until spring, or until it was determined what could be done."
CONFIDENTIAL.
HEADQUARTERS, Russellville, E. Tenn., January 10, 1864.
General R.E. LEE, Commanding, &c.: If we could leave our cavalry here to destroy the railroad and take our infantry to Virginia, it seems to me that we might…throw our forces behind General [George Meade’s Army of the Potomac] and catch him in the mud, and either push on and get Washington…; or you might make arrangements to mount a corps, for locomotion, and throw it with your cavalry behind Meade, and let it push on and get Washington. These plans cannot be well digested, as I have no information as to the difficulties, &c…. We could begin to retire from here about the 10th of February, and upon reaching Bristol have transportation for Gordonsville ready. Everything should be in readiness for us upon our arrival at Gordonsville or Staunton, so that we should meet with no delay…. My position under present circumstances seems to be somewhat precarious. I am just strong enough to tempt the enemy to concentrate against me, and either destroy me or drive me back as far as he chooses. General Johnston cannot aid me, as the enemy can occupy his fortifications about Chattanooga and send up such forces here as he chooses. We should have the means of communication and cooperation, or we should not allow two armies to lie between us. I remain, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
Other Union activity reported on this date:
1. Alfred Pleasonton reports a scout to Sperryville, Virginia, “after guerillas” succeeded in “capturing 6.”
2. J.A. Maltby leads an expedition from Vicksburg, Mississippi to Sunnyside Landing, Arkansas, “to disperse rebel forces…obstructing navigation.”
3. Colonel W.J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, leads a scout from Dandridge to Clark’s Ferry, Tennessee.
Other Confederate activity reported on this date:
1. From Fort Sumter, Stephen Elliott Jr., C.S. Artillery, reports the “Ironsides kept [a] revolving light going all night,” and there are “three blockading steamers this morning.”
January 11 1864 (Monday)
After the mutiny which took place last week in Alabama, Roswell Ripley, First Military District, Department of South Carolina, takes no chances when he learns of similar discontent in the Twenty-second South Carolina Regiment stationed on Sullivan's Island. Colonel Henry L. Benbow, 23rd South Carolina, conducts the investigation. He writes: "The investigation...was by no means satisfactory.... I am satisfied, however, that there [still exists] a rebellious state of feeling, the continuance of which was due to the inefficiency of the company officers." General G.T. Beauregard adds his explanation to the report: "The *colonel of this regiment was tried by court-martial on the 14th of May, 1863, from which time he has not been on duty with his command. The lieutenant-colonel [*James O’Connell] has been suspended for months for utter incompetency. The major has been absent for nearly a year without leave. [Major James H. Rion] ..., whom I placed in command of the regiment...is now absent, sick. I earnestly request that steps may be taken to supply this regiment with competent field officers."
HEADQUARTERS, Sullivan's Island, January 11, 1864.
[Captain William F. Nance], Assistant Adjutant-General: I have the honor to report the result of my investigation of the mutinous disaffection believed to exist among the troops on this island…. I am forced to believe that some of these officers have endeavored to conceal the guilt of their men in the matter, while others made light of the whole affair, observing that "it was only talked of in fun." The same state of feeling exists to a more alarming extent in the First Regiment [Regulars] South Carolina Infantry, produced, however, by a different cause the belief of some of the men that their term of enlistment has expired…. A regard for the good of the service leads me respectfully and earnestly to recommend a thorough reorganization of the line officers, and the appointment of competent field officers, as the only adequate means to correct the disagreeable state of feeling existing in the Twenty-second Regiment South Carolina Volunteers. I would also suggest the propriety of removing to a place of security several men belonging to the First Regiment of Infantry, now in confinement for mutinous conduct. Respectfully submitted.
H.L. BENBOW, Colonel, Commanding.
*Editor’s Note: Colonel Spartan D. Goodlett was court-martialed for disobeying the orders of Brigadier-General Nathan S. Evans during the fighting at Kinston, North Carolina. Goodlett claimed the orders were delivered by a drunken aide. Lieutenant-Colonel James O’Connell resigned on January 26, 1864.
From Memphis, Tennessee, William T. Sherman informs General-in-Chief Henry Halleck of his proposed plan for a winter campaign. He writes: "I can make up a force of 20,000 men to strike Meridian, and it maybe Selma. Infantry will move via Vicksburg, Jackson, and Brandon; cavalry down the Mobile & Ohio Road from La Grange, they meeting about Chunky River. If you think we hazard too much you will have time to notify me by telegraph. I shall aim to reach Meridian by February 8, at the furthest." When Sherman reaches Memphis, he immediately begins issuing the necessary orders. "With General Grant's approval [I ordered Stephen A. Hurlbut] to abandon Corinth and all minor points, draw in all public property, and forthwith prepare for field service two good divisions of 5,000 men each.... I ordered all the effective cavalry at once also to be assembled and got ready for the field.... Having made these preliminary orders, I then hastened to Vicksburg." General Hurlbut relays Sherman's orders to his commanders. To A.J. Smith, District of Columbus, he writes: "I need not say to you that rapidity of execution is necessary.... We have a heavy march before us, and the command must be fully prepared. It is the intention of General Sherman to move with...such troops as he can get from Vicksburg…, the cavalry moving down the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to meet us near Meridian, thus forcing the enemy to let go of their hold on Dalton or endangering the loss of Selma, and perhaps Mobile. Close attention is therefore necessary to the fitting out of the individual soldier and will be impressed upon field and line officers."
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, Memphis, January 11, 1864.
Maj. Gen. S.A. HURLBUT, Commanding Sixteenth Army Corps: The time is now for the execution of a design long contemplated, which must be improved, else we may lose a step in the natural development of events…. Everything must give way to the execution of our purpose. You will therefore at once organize out of the Sixteenth Army Corps two strong divisions of infantry, at least 5,000 strong each, with proportionate artillery, and one of cavalry of same strength; in all 15,000…. All the Memphis and Charleston road to be abandoned save so much of it as can be safely held with the remainder of the troops not herein embraced. Abandon Corinth and Fort Pillow absolutely, removing all public property to Cairo or Memphis…. Troops held too long in a city like Memphis…, become enervated. I wish, therefore, a general change to take place…. The present garrison of Memphis…should form the nucleus of one of the infantry divisions.... Make the civil authorities guard their own towns, and hold them responsible that they preserve good order and government.... Please report to me tomorrow, or next day at furthest, your action under this order, as I will go to Vicksburg and return before we actually move, but all must be complete in ten days at furthest. I am, &c.,
W.T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding.
Other Union activity reported on this date:
1. Colonel I.R. Hawkins, 7th Tennessee (U.S.) Cavalry, reports he “detached 100 men” to Lexington, Tennessee, where they killed “1 guerrilla in the very act of robbing.”
2. Lt. Col. Robert Klein, 3rd Indiana Cavalry, leads an expedition up the Little Tennessee River. He reports: “I broke up a nest of guerrillas...and rebel citizens who had been stealing stock and goods...to sell them.”
Other Confederate activity reported on this date:
1. The C.S. Congress passes an Act authorizing the tax on bacon to be “commuted by collection of salt pork as an equivalent."
2. Trans-Mississippi Department commander E.K. Smith reports large numbers of “deserters and absentees” are “crossing the Mississippi River into this department.” He directs all District commanders to “take steps to arrest...all officers and men who have come into...this department without lawful military authority.”
3. From Meridian, Mississippi, Leonidas Polk reports “the enemy has made a landing at Madisonville, on the lake shore in Louisiana.” He writes: “The object is supposed to be…constructing light gunboats for lake service.”
4. In Wilmington, North Carolina, W.H.C. Whiting, Cape Fear District, reports “heavy firing all day at Lockwood's Folly by eight steamers of enemy.” He writes: “One Yankee steamer reported blown up. Explosion heard in town.”
January 12 1864 (Tuesday)
From Knoxville, Tennessee, John G. Foster, Department of the Ohio, complains to Ulysses S. Grant about the lack of supplies available to his troops. He writes: "Many animals are dying.... Everything is eaten out north of Holston River, also nearly everything is eaten up at Mossy Creek.... Some quartermaster stores have arrived, but not in sufficient quantity. No rations by last boats. Am entirely destitute of bread, coffee, and sugar." Even division commander Phillip S. Sheridan is unhappy with the situation. He reports: "My division has been on less than half rations for some days, and are suffering from hunger. We have no forage for the animals, and none can be procured.” U.S. Grant informs General-in-Chief Halleck of the destitute condition of Foster's command: "I felt a particular anxiety to have Longstreet driven from East Tennessee, and went there with the intention of taking such steps as would secure this end. I found, however, a large part of Foster's command suffering for want of clothing, especially shoes, so that in any advance not to exceed two-thirds of his men could be taken.... On the first rise of the Cumberland 1,200,000 rations will be sent to the mouth of the Big South Fork.... In the meantime troops in East Tennessee must depend for subsistence on what they can get from the country and the little we can send them from Chattanooga." Foster even offers the novel idea of paying his men extra to make up for their suffering. He writes: "They are without any compensation for this loss of much-needed food.... In view of these considerations I have the honor to request that authority may be given me to order the chief commissary of the department to pay the troops the value in money of the rations to which they have been entitled, but which they have not received."
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